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Abstract 
This article provides an assessment of labour market adjustments occurring in Estonia during 
the global crisis. As part of the so-called internal devaluation, the strategy followed was very 
successful in shrinking the unit labour costs, thus helping Estonian enterprises to gain 
international competitiveness. The whole gamut of tools available in terms of flexibility was 
used, at least in the worst time of the financial crisis: massive lay-offs, reduced working time 
and wage cuts. At mid-2011, Estonia stood as one of the most dynamic EU country to recover 
with exports growth. On the social side, however, the track record is not as positive: the 
purchasing power of workers has been reduced and unemployment still remains strong and 
persistent despite the economic recovery.  
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1. Introduction: a buoyant economy building disequilibria in the pre-crisis period 
When entering the European Union (EU) in 2004, Estonia was a very dynamic economic, 
with a GDP growth of 8.2 % per year in average over 2000-2003. Good and even better 
economic performances were recorded in the years following its EU accession until the 
financial crisis: GDP growth was 8.6 % per year over 2004-2007, with some signs of 
slowdown in the turning of 2008, thought. The unemployment rate decreased continuously 
throughout the period to reach 4.7 % in 2007, its lowest level since the transition towards 
market economy in Estonia. 
However, the growth model of Estonia was no longer sustainable as too largely based on 
domestic drivers1. In particular, the private consumption, financed by widespread credit to 
households and very dynamic wages, was the most important contributing factor to GDP over 
2004-2007, accounting for 67 % of GDP growth over the period (against 56 % over 2000-
2003). By contrast, external drivers were working poorly and, Estonia accumulated a huge 
current account deficit, reaching 17 % of GDP in 2007. Yet, consumption goods accounted 
for the bulk of trade balance disequilibria, with intermediate and investment goods mainly in 
balance and, primary goods in a slight surplus (Antonin and Levasseur, 2010). 
In terms of economic activity sectors, such a growth model means that the manufacturing 
sector made a low contribution to GDP growth, in particular in the pre-crisis period (Price and 
Wörgötter, 2011). For instance, in 2007, the manufacturing sector contributed for only 9 % to 
the GDP growth (against 27 % over 2000-2003) while those of construction, wholesale & 
retail trade, financial intermediation and real estate contributed altogether for 63 % (49 % 
over 2000-2003).  
To some extent, the year 2004 was a turning point in Estonia: the domestically-based 
growth model was endorsed, fuelled by credit to households and financed by foreign debt. It 
was accompanied by a boom in real estate and construction sector. Last, labour shortages – or, 
fear of labour shortages, due to the possibility for Estonian workers to work in other EU 
countries – exerted strong pressures on wages growth. In particular, wages growth was largely 
exceeding labour productivity growth, which undermined the competitiveness of Estonian 
companies (Levasseur, 2009; Rosenberg, 2008; Purfield and Rosenberg, 2010). Over-
optimistic expectations about the future – with a lot of them related to EU membership – were 
another explanatory factor for both large wage increases and household credit boom. At this 
time, Estonia, altogether with Latvia and Lithuania, were called the Baltic tigers. 
However, in the course of winter 2007, the first signs of slowdown were already present 
and Estonia faced mounting external pressures (Rosenberg, 2008). Then, when Lehman 
Brothers went into bankrupt in September 2008, Estonia experienced large capital outflows, 
thus precipitating further its economy into recession2. At this time, Estonia had to decide for 
devaluating or not the external value of its currency and finally opted to maintain its currency 
board with further steps undertaken for a speedy euro adoption3. Instead a strategy of internal 
                                                 
1 The two other Baltic States (namely Latvia and Lithuania) share a lot of similarities with Estonia in terms of 
growth model (see Brixiova, Vartia and Wörgötter, 2009; Darvas et al., 2011; European Commission, 2010; 
Levasseur, 2009). 
2 To a very large extent, Latvia and Lithuania followed a similar path than Estonia. In December 2008, Latvia 
had to ask for a bailout from the European Union and the IMF while maintaining its fixed exchange rate 
arrangement. 
3 See Box 1 on the arguments against a currency devaluation in Estonia.  
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devaluation consisting in curbing wages to gain a competitive edge by pushing down local 
prices was implemented under the impetus of government. Another component of the strategy 
was a tightening in public expenditures to help to push down prices, reinforcing credibility 
and meeting the 3 % limit in fiscal deficit of the Maastricht criteria to adopt the euro. Yet, in 
the course of 2009, further flexibility on labour market and greater social security provisions 
to workers were legislated to tackle the recession. 
The economy of Estonia has been strongly hit by the global crisis: the GDP has fallen by  
5 % in 2008, then by 13.8 % in 2009. According to the updated forecasts of the Ministry of 
Finance, the GDP would grow by some 7 % in 2011, after 3 % in 2010. 
The goal of this article is to analyse the adjustment of the Estonian labour market in the 
context of the global crisis. In particular, did it succeed in restoring competitiveness of the 
economy? How harmful for workers was the strategy of internal devaluation? The remaining 
of the article is as follows. Section 2 gives a decomposition of the dynamics in unit labour 
costs, thus adopting the viewpoint of an employer. We consider the unit labour cost for the 
total economy and the manufacturing sector, with a focus on the latter as this sector is more 
concerned by international competition. Section 3 adopts the viewpoint of workers by 
analysing the impact of adjustments on workers in terms of purchasing power and 
employment opportunity. Section 4 presents briefly features on institutions and societal 
characteristics of Estonia. Then, section 5 provides an overview on the gains of international 
competitiveness due to the strategy of internal devaluation. Section 6 concludes. 
Box 1 : Arguments against a currency devaluation in Estonia before adopting the euro* 
• The devaluation would have caused a surge in inflation through imports prices 
The prices of final consumption goods which are imported would have been lifted up as well as those of 
intermediate and raw materials which are imported to be processed in Estonian products. That would have 
caused a surge in consumer price index (CPI), thus delaying the euro adoption which requires a low CPI inflation 
to be selected. Another consequence would have been probably an unbroken “price/wage” spiral, as workers 
would have required higher nominal wages to compensate for higher inflation.  
• The devaluation would have been harmful for borrowers who have loans denominated in euros as their 
repayment would have grown from the same amount than the devaluation 
In Estonia, around 90 % of private loans are denominated in euros. Yet, some households are very heavily 
indebted (Herzberg, 2010). Without any discount, they would have gone into bankrupt in case of a currency 
devaluation amounting 15-20 % (as evaluated by commentators), causing in turn losses in the banking sector.  
• The positive effects of a devaluation on exports would have been small, anyway. 
In particular, in a context of a weak global demand [as in 2008/2009], no strong increase in exports could be 
expected from a devaluation.  
• Other negative aspects included a loss of credibility, thus resulting in a higher international borrowing 
cost 
* To a very large extent, similar arguments against devaluation hold for the two other Baltic states.  
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2. A decomposition of the dynamics in unit labour costs during the crisis 
This section aims at giving insights on how labour unit costs have developed in Estonia 
since the beginning of the global crisis. We adopt an hourly perspective rather than a per 
worker perspective to stand out how employers have used the worked hours per worker to 
adjust the impact of global crisis4. In the appendix, we provide a technical note on the 
decomposition of unit labour costs or, put differently, of the “wage bill”.  
2.1. The fall in wages and its impact on labour cost 
At the very beginning of the global crisis, it became clear that the previous wages policy 
implemented in Estonia – as well as in the two other Baltic states – should be halted, as the 
wage growth was largely outstripping the productivity growth (Levasseur, 2009; Purfield and 
Rosenberg, 2010). The government of Estonia decided some cuts of wages in the public 
sector, hoping for a “demonstrating” effect on the private sector. Looking at data, it appears 
that the nominal labour cost have decreased substantially (Graph 1): its growth rate while 
peaking at more than 20 % at the end of 2007 turned to be negative in the course of 2009. The 
fall in nominal labour cost was smaller and shorter time lasting in the manufacturing sector 
than in other sectors of the economy, thought. The largest cumulated falls in nominal labour 
costs have been recorded in construction sector, then in public services (Table 1). In the first 
quarter of 2011, the hourly labour costs in public and market services stood at 7.1 euros per 
hour, which was slightly above the average for the total economy. 
 
 
Graph 1: Nominal hourly labour cost in Estonia (growth rate, in %) 
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Source : Central bank of Estonia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Hijzen and Venn (2010) provide evidence that reduction in working time has been used in 16 OECD countries 
out of 19 during the global crisis. See as well Cahuc and Carcillo (2011) on short-time work schemes adopted to 
tackle the recession.  
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Table 1: Nominal hourly labour cost in Estonia, by large sector 
 
Level 2011Q1
2008 2009 2010 2011Q1* in euros
Total 15.8 -1.3 -1.6   1.8 7.0
Manufacturing 13.4  0.5 -0.8   2.2 6.7
Construction 12.4 -7.7 -1.3 -4.2 6.9
Market services** 15.1  0.0 -4.6  4.8 7.1
Public services** 18.9 -3.6  2.2 -1.1 7.1
* With respect 2010Q1.
** The public services consist of public administration, defense and compulsory social
security, education and health sectors. The market services consist of remaining services
sectors.
Source : Central bank of Estonia; computations of the author.
Growth (year-to-year), in %
 
 
However, once considered the prices development in Estonia, there is no doubt that the real 
labour cost in the manufacturing sector has substantially decreased over 2010 (Table 2). In 
particular, the hourly labour cost decreased by 6.8 % in 2010 when the export price index is 
used as a deflator (4.4 % when the producer price index is used). As a result, 2010 was very 
successful in alleviating labour costs of Estonian enterprises. A similar conclusion holds for 
the first quarter of 2011 (last data available): the hourly labour cost deflated by either the 
export price index or the producer price index is pursuing its decreasing trend (respectively     
-7.2 % and -3.6 %). 
 
Table 2: Real hourly labour cost in manufacturing sector of Estonia  
– different index prices – 
2008 2009 2010 2011Q1*
Producer price index (PPI) deflator 7.4 2.8 -4.4 -3.6
Export price index (EPI) deflator 9.2 4.2 -6.8 -7.2
* With respect 2010Q1
Source : Central bank of Estonia; computations of the author.  
 
2.2. The fall in employment and hours worked 
In Estonia, employment began to drop sharply as soon as the very beginning of the global 
crisis. In particular, in the manufacturing sector, some 15.5 % of the workforce was lay-off 
over 2009, and another 5.7 % over 2010 (Table 3). For the total economy, employment 
decelerated by respectively 10 % and 4.7% over 2009 and 2010. 
Changes in worked hours – due to part-time working plans or unpaid holidays – had a 
huge protecting effect on Estonian employment, especially in 2009. According to Bank of 
Estonia (2010), some 50,000 jobs would have been saved as early as the first quarter of 2009 
due to reductions in working time (Graph 2). That would account for more than 7 % of the 
Estonian labour force. The average hours worked per worker have declined by 1.1 % in 2008, 
and then by 2.3 % in 2009 (Table 3). The reduction in working time was even larger in the 
manufacturing sector, especially in 2009 with a decline of 3.2% in the average hours worked 
per worker. With the recovery in 2010, the average hours worked have been adjusted upward, 
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increasing by 2.1 % in the total economy and 5.1 % in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Table 3: Decomposing growth of hourly labour productivity in Estonia  
 
Total economya) Productivity Value added Employment Hours 
2008 -4.1  -5.0   0.2 -1.1
2009 -1.5 -13.8 -10.0 -2.3
2010  5.6   3.0 -4.7   2.1
       2011Q1* -0.4   8.5  6.5   2.4
Manufacturingb) Productivity Value added Employment Hours 
2008 -5.5  -3.8   2.9 -1.3
2009 -6.1 -24.8      -15.5 -3.2
2010 20.9  20.4 -5.7   5.1
       2011Q1*  3.9  28.9 22.6   2.4
* With respect 2010Q1
a) GDP at market price, chain-linked volume.
b) Value added, chain-linked volume.
Source : Central bank of Estonia; computations of the author.  
 
Graph 2: Number of jobs saved in Estonia due to part-time working plans or unpaid 
holidays 
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  Source: Bank of Estonia (2010); updated by the author for 2010Q2-2010Q4. 
 
2.3. The impact on hourly productivity and (real) unit labour cost 
As summarized in Table 3, the hourly productivity in the Estonian manufacturing sector 
was considerably deteriorated in 2008 and 2009 while substantially recovering in 2010. Over 
2009, the massive layoffs (-15.5 %) and reduction in hours worked (-3.2 %) were not 
sufficient to compensate the dramatic fall in the volume of value added in the manufacturing 
sector (-24.8 %): the productivity per hour declined by 6.1 %. Over 2010, as the economic 
situation improved, the demand of labour was immediately met by increases in working hours 
(+5.1 %) while employment initially continued to decline (-5.7 %). With a 20.4 % growth in 
value added, the productivity per hour in the Estonian manufacturing sector surged by 20.9 %. 
For the total economy, the growth rate of productivity per hour in 2010 is less impressive 
(+5.6 %), but still in line with its pre-crisis levels. 
Combined with developments in hourly labour cost (reported in tables 1 and 2), it is clear 
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that the (real) unit labour cost increased sharply throughout 2008 and 2009 while turning 
strongly negative over 2010 (Table 4). This substantial improvement of competitiveness in 
2010 has helped considerably Estonia in resuming with export-led growth (see below). The 
real unit labour cost continued to decline during the first quarter of 2011, albeit to a lesser 
extent than over 2011. 
 
Table 4: Growth of real hourly unit labour cost in manufacturing sector of Estonia 
– different index prices – 
 
Producer price index (PPI) deflator Export price index (EPI) deflator
2008  12.9  14.7
2009    8.9  10.3
2010 -25.3 -27.7
2011Q1*  -7.5 -11.1
* With respect 2010Q1
Source : Central bank of Estonia; computations of the author.  
3. The labour market adjustment in Estonia during the crisis and its impact on workers 
3.1. Its impact on purchasing power of workers 
While the fall in labour costs allowed Estonian firms to restore their international 
competitiveness, that came at a cost of a lower purchasing power for Estonian workers. In 
particular, a reduced working time, combined with a fall in wages, have induced a drop in 
monthly net wages of employees in 2009. With virtually no consumer prices inflation, the 
drop was around 4.5 % in 2009 in both nominal and real terms (Table 5). Another 
contributing factor to the drop was the rise of unemployment insurance premium, from 0.6 % 
to 2 % in June 2009, and then to 2.8 % in August 2009. Throughout 2010, the real monthly 
net wages continued to decline (-3.2 %), mainly as a result of a surge in consumer prices 
inflation which was largely driven by food and commodity prices. In the first quarter of 2011, 
higher hourly wages and working time were not sufficient to compensate vigourous consumer 
prices inflation: the real monthly net wages decreased by 1.1 %. To sum up, the cumulated 
loss of purchasing power for an Estonian employee has been 8.8 % since 2009 or, scaled 
differently, equivalent to 18.6 % of his gains in purchasing power obtained over 2004-2008.  
 
Table 5: Growth of monthly net wages in Estonia (in %) 
Nominal (net) CPI inflation Real (net)
2008 15.1 10.4   4.7
2009 -4.6 -0.1 -4.5
2010 -0.2   3.0 -3.2
2011Q1**  4.3   5.4 -1.1
* Net from labour taxes and unemployment insurance premium.
** With respect 2010Q1
Source : Central bank of Estonia; computations of the author.  
 
3.2. Its impact on unemployment 
The economic crisis has had huge consequences on unemployment. According to the 
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Labour force Survey, the unemployment rate steadily increased as soon as the fall of 2008, 
tripling between 2008 and 2009 to reach 13.8 % in 2009 and then 16.9 % in 2010 (Table 6). 
Figures reported by the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund are lower as some 
unemployed persons are not registered to the Fund5. But the two alternative unemployment 
rates are in line, with a rise from 2008 to 2010 and then a decrease over the first semester of 
2011. At the end of June 2011 (last figures available), the unemployment rate stood at 13.3 % 
according to the Labour force Survey and 8.1 % according to the Estonian Unemployment 
Insurance Fund.  
 
Table 6: Some statistics on unemployed and unemployment benefits 
2008 2009 2010 2011S1
Unemployment rate (in %) according to
   • Statistics Estonia (based on Labour Force Survey) 5.5 13.8 16.9 13.9
   • Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund (based on registrations) 3.0 10.2 12.3   9.5
Share of unemployed receiving unemployment benefits (insurance and allowances)
   • as a share of new registred unemployed (in %)* 73% 77% 65% 51%
   • as a share of total registred unemployed (in %)* 56% 60% 46% 36%
   • as a share of total unemployed (in %)** 31% 44% 33% 25%
Average unemployment insurance benefit payment (per beneficiary and month)
   • in euros 228 284 263 254
   • as a share of minimum wage (in %)*** 82% 102% 95% 91%
Unemployment rate (in %) by groups**
Sex • Male   5.8 16.9 19.5 ..
Sex • Female   5.3 10.6 14.3 ..
Age • 15-24 old 12.0 27.5 32.9 ..
Age • 25-54 old   4.8 12.9 15.2 ..
Age • 55-64 old   4.1   9.4 16.2 ..
Citizenship • Estonian   4.2 11.0 13.4 ..
Citizenship • Non-estonian   8.2 19.0 23.4 ..
Education • Low educated (below upper secondary education) 12.0 28.6 30.9 ..
Education • Middle educated (secondary education)   5.8 15.8 19.3 ..
Education • High educated (tertiary education)   2.9   6.2   9.3 ..
* Based on unemployed people registered to the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund.
** Based on unemployed people according to the Labour Force Survey.
***The minimum wage is set to 278 euros per month since 2008.
Sources: Central bank of Estonia; Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund; own computations.  
Among groups, those of males, young, non-Estonians and low-educated have suffered the 
most from labour market adjustments, falling in unemployment relatively more than females, 
middle-aged, Estonians and high-educated (Table 6). In particular, the highest unemployment 
rate is for the group of young, with 33 % of them to be unemployed in 2010. People with a 
low-education constitute another group where unemployment rate stood at a high level 
(almost 31 % in 2010). Yet, with the global crisis, long-term unemployment has surged: some 
45 % of unemployed were without job since more than 12 months in 2010 (against 31 % in 
2008) while those in unemployment since less than 6 months accounted for 33 % (against 53 
% in 2008). 
                                                 
5 Registration depends on the position over the business cycle as well as the benefits accompanying the 
registration (unemployment insurance, unemployment benefits, health insurance and training courses). As the 
legislation regarding benefits changed in mid-2009 to become more generous, the share of registered 
unemployed in total unemployed jumped from 55 % in 2008 to 74 % in 2009. 
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Despite the recovery in 2010 and 2011, the unemployment rate remains high in Estonia 
for several reasons. First, gains in productivity have allowed to produce ceteris paribus more 
goods and services per employee, thus reducing the need of hiring new workers to face higher 
demand for goods and services. Yet, the negative side of flexible working time arrangement is 
that a recovery in production does not induce necessarily a recovery in employment of same 
magnitude, as a higher need for hours worked is fulfilled by incumbent workers (see Table 3). 
Second, the pre-crisis structure of the economy is no longer sustainable. Workers from 
previous booming sectors (construction, real estate), which lost their job during the crisis, 
could not get a job in the same sectors: they have to be trained to get a job in sectors where 
recovery occurs. In particular, employment in construction sector accounted for 87,400 
persons at its peak (reached in the third quarter of 2007) or, put differently, for more than 13 
% of total Estonian employment. Currently, some 52,000 persons are engaged in the 
construction sector, thus regaining “only” 11,400 persons since the trough. At the same time, 
as 52,000 persons corresponds roughly to the number of engaged at the beginning of the 
boom in construction sector, there is little hope to get massive employment opportunity in 
construction sector in the future.  
 
3.3. Its impact on benefits of unemployed 
Looking at benefits, due to changes in legislation (see Box 2), the share of unemployed 
receiving unemployment benefits has increased in 2009, to amount 77 % of new registered, 
60 % of total registered and 44 % of total unemployed (Table 6). However, with the 
protracted period of bad economic times, the share of unemployed receiving benefits has 
decreased steadily, with only 51 % of new registered receiving unemployment benefits over 
the first semester of 2011 as more unemployed entered the labour market without meeting the 
requirements for receiving benefits (mainly young people). As a share of total registered, a 
slightly more than one third (36 %) have received benefits while the figure falls at 25 % for 
the share of total unemployed, which is clearly a small percentage. 
The average unemployment insurance benefit payment per beneficiary has increased in 
2009 to reach 284 euros, accounting for slightly more than 100 % of the Estonian minimum 
wage. As the minimum wage stands at a particular low level in Estonia (accounting for 35 % 
of the average national wage in 2009 against 60 % in most EU countries), that means that the 
unemployment benefit system is not particularly generous despite steps taken towards higher 
provisions with the new Employment Contracts Act (see Box 2). The degressivity of the 
unemployment benefit, combined with a longer time in unemployment, has induced a 
decrease in the average unemployment benefit payment over the time: for the first semester, it 
amounts at 254 euros or a little more than 90 % of the Estonian minimum wage.  
3.4. Its impact on migrations 
In Estonia, net emigration has substantially recovered in 2010 to reach around 2,500 
persons (or 1.90/00 of population) against 700 persons per year over 2008-2009 (Table 7). Two 
main flows explain the recovery in net emigration. First, there is a rebound in outflows, 
especially towards Finland which constitutes the main country of destination of emigrants. 
Estonian citizens accounted for the bulk of this outflow (+17.4 % over 2009/2010). Second, 
inflows of population have recorded a very sharp decline, especially those of non-Estonian 
citizenship (-46.2 % over 2009/2010). By contrast, the so-called return immigration has only 
slightly declined over 2008-2010. 
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A high persistency of unemployment in Estonia, despite the economic recovery in 2010, 
has prompted some Estonian workers to go abroad (and, in first instance, in Finland where 
wages are higher). Similarly, workers from abroad have found lower incentives to enter 
Estonia where employment opportunities were reduced, especially in the construction sector 
which attracted a large share of immigrants in Estonia during the pre-crisis period6. Rather 
paradoxically, if outflows of Estonians workers were to continue in the future, this would 
create again a shortage of some skills (or at least a mismatching) as experienced in the pre-
crisis period, thus exerting again wage pressures. If a portion of wage increases observed 
since the beginning of 2011 (Table 1) may be explained by a recovery of emigration is 
however out the scope of this paper as no data are available for the first quarters of 2011.  
 
Table 7: Outflows and inflows of population in Estonia 
Emigration   (A) Total Share of Share of 
Estonian citizenship non-Estonian citizenship
2008 4406 88% 12%
2009 4658 85% 15%
2010 5294 88% 12%
Immigration (B) Share of Share of 
Total Estonian citizenship non-Estonian citizenship
2008 3671 47% 53%
2009 3884 43% 57%
2010 2810 57% 43%
Net emigration Total in 0/00 of population
(A)-(B)
2008 735 0.6
2009 774 0.6
2010 2484 1.9
Source : Central bank of Estonia; computations of the author.
31%
36%
1st country of destination:
66%
Finland
31%
Finland
62%
59%
1st country of origin:
 
4. Discussion on institutional and societal characteristics of Estonia 
So, how explaining that the labour force in Estonia accepts a so painful adjustment in 
terms of wages cuts and lower employment protection? In particular, why there was much 
more downward flexibility in the wages of Estonia than anywhere else in Europe during the 
crisis (Table 8)? This is quite surprising for a lot of observers. While the magnitude of the 
crisis in Estonia (compared to other EU countries) may be a relevant explanatory factor, other 
explanations are rooted in the institutional framework as well as in societal characteristics of 
the country. 
First, the coverage rates of collective bargaining in Estonia are very low by any standard, 
with only 12 % of firms with a collective bargaining agreement (Table 8). That corresponds to 
less than 9 % of Estonian employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. Such 
                                                 
6 For a deep analysis of the pre-crisis migration in the Baltic labour markets, the reader will consult Hazans and 
Philips (2011). 
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figures contrast sharply with those reported for other EU countries. In a very deteriorated 
economic environment – when fears to be unemployed were growing and employment 
opportunity abroad was reduced –, that means that Estonian workers had only a modest 
bargaining power to avoid wage cuts. Moreover, as trade unions play a role of minor 
importance in Estonia, they could neither oppose to some practices such as a reduced working 
time and forced leaves without any monetary compensation. 
Second, after several years of wage euphoria in the pre-crisis period, workers may have 
expressed little reluctance to accept wage cuts. Let’s keep in mind that over 2002-2008, the 
monthly net wage has been multiplied by 2.2 in Estonia, which tends to minimize the wage 
cuts observed in the onset of the global crisis (Table 4). Workers themselves may have found 
that something was going wrong or was “too good to last”. Only little social unrest was 
recorded in Estonia when the government announced wage cuts in the public sector, thus 
signalling some acceptance by the population. 
Third, and related to the previous point, wage cuts may have been viewed as the ultimate 
sacrifice towards a full integration into the European sphere7. The euro adoption was a key 
goal in Estonia and devaluating the currency would have delayed this prospect for a very long 
time. Estonia would have thus turned its back on nearly twenty years of fixity with respect the 
Deutsch Mark and then the euro through its currency board. 
 
                                                 
7 See Dombrovski and Ǻslund (2011) for a similar argument in the case of Latvia. 
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Table 8 : Wages cut/freeze and collective bargaining in international comparison 
% of firms % of employees
Plan to cut Did freeze Plan to freeze with covered by
Austria 1.7 1.5   1.8  8.4 97.8 94.6
Belgium 1.0 1.8 23.7  4.4 99.4 89.3
Czech republic 9.0 3.2 54.6 11.7 54.0 50.2
Cyprus 1.8 2.0 20.6   5.9 .. ..
Estonia          44.1          38.6 61.5 64.6 12.1  8.7
Spain 2.6 0.5 26.7  3.7          100.0 96.8
France 1.9 4.7 86.0 83.8 99.9 67.1
Luxembourg 2.0 4.3 31.7 62.8 .. ..
Italy 0.3 0.3 46.8 44.5 99.6 97.0
Netherlands 2.6 3.8 15.2  8.7 75.5 67.6
Poland 4.2 1.6 18.0  8.1 22.9 19.3
* Share of enterprises (in %) that have reduced/frozen wages from autumn 2008 to summer 2009 or planned to do. Based on a
survey of enterprise managers carried out by central banks of 10 EU member States within the Wage Dynamic Network.
** Either at a "firm-level'' or a "higher level".
Source : Tari Room (2010); Babecký et al. (2010)
Did cut
Share of enterprises cutting wages* Share of enterprises freezing wages* Collective bargaining agreement**
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Box 2: The new Employment Contracts Act of 2009* 
On the 1st July 2009, the new Employment Contracts Act entered into force, changing significantly the 
labour law in Estonia. Its aim was to make the labour market more flexible while enhancing the social security 
provisions for workers. 
• Measures for a greater flexibility8 
With respect working time, under the new Employment Contracts Act, the employers are no longer obliged to get 
the permission from the Labour Inspectorate to reduced working time. As under the previous law, employers 
have the right to implement reduced working time for a maximum of three months during a one-year period. No 
monetary compensation for time not worked is offered to workers. That differs from the German system – for 
instance – which offers a 60 % compensation to workers.  
With respect lay-offs, the dismissal procedure is made easier by reducing the term of advance notice for 
terminating an employment contract. For instance, the term of advance notice becomes 15 calendar days if 
employment relationship is shorter than 1 year and 30 calendar days for employment relationship of 1 to 5 years. 
To compensate for that, the employer is obligated to provide free time to the employee for job-seeking after 
giving the advance notice.  
With respect the financial burden of lay-off compensations, their payment is now distributed between the 
employer and the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund. In all cases, the employer will pay a lay-off 
compensation amounting to one month’s average wage of the employee. For employment relationship of 5 to 10 
years, one additional month of lay-off compensation will be paid by the Unemployment Insurance Fund to the 
employee (two additional months in case of a relationship over 10 years). The rationality behind such 
distribution in the financial burden of lay-off compensations is to allow employers to invest in their companies, 
to continue offering jobs and create new jobs when the situation improves (Tur and Viilmann, 2009). 
 
With respect employment contracts, the conclusion of fixed-term contract is allowed in all cases. 
• Measures for improving the social security provisions 
With respect taxes, the unemployment insurance premiums were increased to cope with the decreasing financial 
resources of the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund in a context of higher lay-offs. The unemployment 
insurance rates paid by the employees raised from 0.6 % over 2006-May 2009 to 2 % in June 2009 and then to 
2.8 % in August 2009. For employers, the corresponding increases were from 0.3 % over 2006-May 2009 to 1 % 
in June 2009 and then to 1.4 % in August 2009. 
With respect benefits, the unemployment insurance system becomes more generous. In particular, the 
unemployment insurance benefit was increased from 50 % to 70 % of the previous average remuneration during 
the first 100 days of unemployment, and from 40 % to 50 % after that period. In addition, the circle of persons 
eligible for unemployment insurance benefit is enhanced to include, for instance, those who terminated their 
employment relationship voluntarily.  
• Other measures for fighting unemployment 
With respect job matching and training programs, financing is enhanced by using EU funds with the goal to 
absorb new labour force (students) and workers formerly employed in overheating sectors (construction, real 
estate) and, more generally, to avoid long-term unemployment. 
*The reader can consult Tur and Viilmann (2009) or EIROnline at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/ 
 
                                                 
8 Lehmann and Muravyev (2011) present evidence that lower employment protection legislation (EPL) enhances 
labour market outcomes (in the sense of lower unemployment rates and higher employment rates).  
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4. Impact on competitiveness of Estonian enterprises 
 While it may be still premature to provide a definitive assessment on how successful 
was the strategy of wage cuts in Estonia, we can give some preliminary positive indicators.  
First, either based on the producer price index (PPI) or the unit labour cost (ULC), the real 
effective exchange rate of Estonia in manufacturing sector is well oriented. Thus, by end-June 
2011, the ULC-based real effective exchange rate had fallen from its peak (reached in the first 
quarter of 2009) by 23%, and that, in a context of moderate currency depreciations of its main 
trade partners. This allowed to fully cancel the appreciation in the ULC-based real effective 
exchange rate that occurred since end-2006 in Estonia (Graph 3). 
Second, growth of exports over 2010 was much more dynamic in Estonia than in any 
other EU countries, including those with a large depreciation of their nominal exchange rates. 
Estonian exports surged by some 35 % in 2010. Importantly, all types of manufacturing goods 
have recorded a strong increase in their exports, with investment goods recording the largest 
increase (+75 %). 
According to Eesti Pank (2011, p.17-18), nearly a third of the strong export growth in 
recent months may be attributable to growing competitiveness of the Estonian companies, 
with two-thirds attributable to the destination market and the specific need of exports partners 
and exports goods (in particular, demand for investment goods in Sweden and Finland). Put 
differently, Estonia would have succeeded in gaining market shares over the last year.  
Graph 3: Real effective exchange rate of Estonia (based on unit labour cost) 
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             Source : Eurostat. 
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5. Conclusion 
Embarking into a strategy of internal devaluation instead of an external one was rather 
challenging at time when the global economy was subject to a major turmoil. Estonia, as well 
as the two other Baltic states, made this courageous and – retrospectively – judicious choice. 
Does it mean that devaluating internally is the new panacea while external devaluation would 
be an outdated strategy to restore competitiveness ? The answer requires caution as there is no 
one-size solution for all countries. First, in the period following the bankrupt of Lehman 
Brothers, the global economic environment was so depressed that any devaluation would have 
had virtually no effects on the Estonian exports9. In such context, only higher imports prices 
and higher reimbursements for those indebted in euros would have been materialized, with 
harmful effects on the purchasing power of households (see box 1). While it may be argued 
that internal devaluation has also reduced the purchasing power of households, wage cuts may 
be viewed as a better solution as widespread over all workers. By contrast, an external 
devaluation would have hurt predominantly households indebted in euros. Second, it has to be 
pointed out that population is arguably more prompted to accept wage cuts after several years 
of large wage increases – as in the Baltic states during the pre-crisis period – than after several 
years of sluggish wages. In this respect, the lessons to be drawn from the experience of 
Estonia for other EMU members regarding wage cuts have to be not misguided. Moreover, it 
should be noted that if all EMU countries practiced a strategy of internal devaluation, none of 
them would benefit from it. 
                                                 
9 For instance, the Polish currency depreciated by some 29 % from October 2008 to March 2009 without any 
stimulating effects on exports. 
 16
Bibliography 
Alesina A., S. Ardagna, V. Galasso (2008), The euro and structural reforms, NBER 
Working Paper, n° 14479, November. 
Antonin C., and S. Levasseur (2010), Estonie: l’euro détrône la couronne, Lettre de 
l’OFCE, n°325, December (in french). 
Arpaia, A., and G. Carone (2004), Do labour taxes (and their composition) affect wages in 
the short and the long run?, European Economy Economic Papers, No 216. 
Babecký, J., Du Caju, P., Kosma, T., Lawless, M., Messina, J., Rõõm, T., (2010), 
Downward Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity: Survey Evidence from European Firms, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 112(4), pp. 643–910. 
Bank of Estonia (2010), Labour Market Review, 2/2010. 
Brixiova Z., L. Vartia and Wörgötter A. (2009), Capital Inflows, Household Debt and the 
Boom-Bust Cycle in Estonia, OECD Economics Department Working Paper n°700. 
Cahuc, P. and S. Carcillo (2011), “Is short-time work a good method to keep 
unemployment down?”, CEPR Discussion Paper 8214. 
Pisany-Ferry J., Petrovic P., Landesmann M.A., Gligorov V., Daianu D., Becker T., 
Darvas Z., Sapir A., Weder di Mauro B.(2010), Whither growth in central and eastern 
Europe? Policy lessons for an integrated Europe, Blueprints, Bruegel Institute, 24 november.  
De Caju P., E. Gautier, D. Momferatou, M. Ward-Warmedinger (2008), Institutional 
features of wage bargaining in 23 European countries, the US and Japan, IZA Discussion 
Paper Series, n°3867. 
Dombrovski V., and A. Ǻslund (2011), How Latvia came through the financial crisis, 
Peterson Institute for International Studies, May.  
EIRO Annual Review (2011), available at : 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1004019s/ee1004019q.htm 
EIRO (2009), Unemployment insurance premiums to rise again, available at 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/08/articles/ee0908019i.htm 
Eesti Pank (2011), Economic Forecast for 2011-2013, Estonian Economy and Monetary 
Policy 1/2011, p.4-33. 
Hazans M., Philips K. (2011), The Post-Enlargement Migration Experience in the Baltic 
Labour Markets, IZA Discussion Paper Series, July. 
Herzberg V. (2010), Assessing the Risk of Private Sector Debt Overhang in the Baltic 
Countries, IMF Working Paper WP/10/250, November. 
Hijzen, A. and D. Venn (2010), “The role of short-time work schemes during the 2008-09 
 17
recession”, OECD Working Paper n°115. 
IMF (2011), Country Report No. 11/47, February. 
Lehmann H., and A. Muravyev (2010), Labour market institutions and labour market 
performance: what can we learn from transition countries?," Working Papers 714, 
Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.  
Lehmann H., and A. Muravyev (2011), Labour Markets and Labour Market Institutions in 
Transition Economies, IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 5905, August. 
Levasseur S.(2009), États baltes et Irlande : de l’euphorie à la dépression salariale, Lettre 
de l’OFCE, n°312, July (in French). 
Perez, J., Fuentes, S., Jesus, A.(2010), Is There a Signalling Role for Public Wages? 
Evidence for the Euro Area Based on Macro Data, Working Paper Series, European Central 
Bank. 
Price R., and A. Wörgötter (2011), Estonia: making the Most of Globalisation, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, N°876, OECD. 
Purfield C., and C.B. Rosenberg (2010), Adjustment Under a Currency Peg: Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania During the Global Financial Crisis 2008-09, IMF Working paper 
WP/10/213., September  
Rosenberg C.(2008), Avoiding the Portuguese Trap, “Convergence in the Baltics”, 
seminar organized by IMF and Eesti Pank in Brussels, February 1-2, 2008. 
Rosenberg C. (2011), Toughing It Out: How the baltics Defied Predictions, IMF direct_ 
The IMF Blog, posted on January 7. 
Room T.(2010); Enterprises’ response to the economic crisis, Labour Market Review 
1/2010, Appendix 1, Eesti Pank, p.31-36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
APPENDIX 
Decomposing the labour share (or “wage bill”) in value added 
 
Let’s assume that the labour share in value added at time t is given by: 
 W Hshare (a)
P Y
W 1 (b)
P Y / H
W 1 (c)
P Pr od
=
=
=
t t
t
t t
t
t t t
t
t t
 
WH  denotes the “wage bill” where W, the nominal wage per hour, is multiplied by H, the 
total number of hours worked. PY  stands for the nominal value added, with P denoting for its 
price and Y for its volume. Wages are gross amounts, i.e. before the deduction of income tax 
and social security contributions.  
The labour share in value added can be written as (b) where W
P
 denotes the real wage per 
hour and Y / H  (or “Prod”) denotes the labour productivity per hour. 
In turn, H  can be decomposed as: 
H h N=t t t  
where N  accounts for the number of workers and h  for the number of hours worked per 
worker. 
In log-approximation, the dynamics of the labour share in value added between t and t-1 is 
then given by: 
( )Wshare Pr od
P
⎛ ⎞Δ = Δ −Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
t
t t
t
     (1) 
where  W
P
⎛ ⎞Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
t
t
 denotes the growth rate of real wage per hour between t and t-1  
( )Pr odΔ t  stands for the growth rate of labour productivity per hour between t and t-1.  
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In turn, the growth rate of labour productivity can be decomposed as: 
 ( )Pr odΔ t = Y h NΔ −Δ −Δt t t      (2) 
The movements in labour productivity will depend on: 
 * the growth rate of value added in volume (denoted Y )Δ t  
 * the development in working time ( hΔ t ) 
 * the volume of workers used for the production ( NΔ t ) 
Thus, in the context of the global crisis, the labour productivity may still increase if 
working time and/or volume of workers are substantially reduced (i.e. above the reduction of 
value added). A decomposition of labour productivity’s movements – as in equation (2) – can 
thus provide useful insights on the way enterprises in a country have adjusted during the 
global crisis. Combined with a decomposition of labour share’s movements – as in equation 
(1) –, we can thus analyze how wages have been adjusted to changes in labour productivity.  
Note: Of course, the above decomposition is for “apparent” labour productivity, thus 
abstracting from capital or other inputs used in the production. 
 
 
